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I. PROJECT OBJECTIVES 
 
Introduction and Objective 
 
Pastoralists in East Africa’s arid and semi-arid lands (ASAL) regularly confront climatic shocks 
that plunge them into massive herd die-offs and loss of scarce wealth.  One of the most puzzling 
features of pastoralist behavior in times of stress has been their relatively low and non-responsive 
rate of marketed off-take of animals when faced with likely losses to herd mortality.  As Figure 
1, from Desta (1999), finds in 17-year herd history data from Borana pastoralists in southern 
Ethiopia, mortality always exceeds net sales as a share of beginning period herd size, with the 
latter never exceeding three percent and moving hardly at all in response to shocks to rangeland 
carrying capacity that cause regular spikes in mortality rates.  This case might be more 
pronounced than others, but the basic pattern is widely believed representative of herd dynamics 
and marketing patterns among east African ASAL pastoralists.  
             Figure 1 
Converting any significant share of ASAL 
pastoralists’ mortality losses into sales could 
avert widespread, acute human suffering and, 
by conserving local wealth, might accelerate 
both herd recapitalization once range conditions 
improve and economic growth more broadly.  
Investments that might increase pastoralist 
marketing responsiveness to temporal variation 
in range conditions might thereby quickly pay 
for themselves through reduced demand for 
relief aid.  As part of a collaborative module 
between the Livestock Early Warning System (LEWS) and Pastoral Risk Management 
(PARIMA) projects of the USAID Global Livestock Collaborative Research Support Program 
(GL CRSP), we set out to improve our understanding of observed livestock off-take behavior by 
ASAL pastoralists so as to help identify feasible interventions that might induce conversion of 
mortality losses during times of stress into marketed off-take.   
 
Toward that end, we aimed to understand two interrelated issues:  
 
(1) what factors limit pastoralists' marketed off-take response to predictable fluctuations in 
underlying livestock  productivity/survivability that are associated with shocks to climate, 
range conditions and disease?   and  
 
(2) what might be done to foster more responsive pastoral livestock marketing systems by 
relaxing those constraints? 
 
This report presents our findings on issue (1) and discusses the implications for issue (2). 
 
 
Research Design 
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In order to address the first issue above, we collected and analyzed primary data on pastoralist 
and trader behavior through survey-based methods at household and market level, participant-
observer methods and social analysis of the livestock marketing chain, and integrated qualitative 
and quantitative analysis of livestock market performance, supplemented with analysis of 
secondary data on livestock marketing patterns and analysis of primary data our team had 
recently collected in the region under other auspices. We built on ongoing survey work by the 
PARIMA project among 330 pastoral households in northern Kenya and southern Ethiopia. We 
supplemented the household-level survey with a second data collection activity on livestock 
trade at the market level. A typology of livestock markets was created based on geo-referenced 
location, marketing chain position, institutional sales arrangements, throughput characteristics, 
etc.  We then did daily or weekly transactions level surveys in Marigat, Marsabit, North Horr and 
Suguta Marmar periodic livestock markets in northern Kenya. This was complemented by an in-
depth qualitative study of trader networks and animal processing facilities throughout the 
southern Ethiopia and northern Kenya region, down to terminal markets in Nairobi.  This first 
phase was led by the PARIMA team. 
 
This collaborative module’s second phase addressed the second issue above by developing 
recommendations for ASAL stakeholders based on simulation modeling of alternative 
interventions meant to address the various limiting factors identified in the module’s first phase.  
The second phase was led by the LEWS team.  Our outreach partners in governmental and non-
governmental organizations in Ethiopia, Kenya and the ASARECA region more broadly were 
especially involved in discussions of both issues (1) and (2) throughout the project.  
 
The literature on ASAL pastoralism is replete with untested hypotheses as to why marketed off-
take rates are so low and non-responsive to biophysical shocks to expected livestock survival 
rates.  Some of these revolve around pastoralist behavior, some around trader behavior, and 
others around the functioning of the broader marketing system.  Any successful effort at 
modifying pastoralist marketing behavior must be well-targeted at relieving which of the 
constraints proves binding. It thus becomes crucial to tackle systematically the various 
hypotheses extant in the literature.  We were able to identify and test seven hypothesized 
constraints to ASAL pastoralist livestock marketing behavior: 
 
a) There is nothing to spend cash on and no place to save financial assets securely at a 
positive real rate of interest. Such a finding would indicate a need for pastoral 
banking to create a supply stimulus for livestock markets. 
 
b) Information (about future range condition, animal condition, or prices) is insufficient 
for pastoralists or traders to plan or justify incurring certain marketing costs in the 
face of uncertain receipts. If information is limiting, providing information (such as 
drought early warning, animal condition status, price broadcasts, etc.) may have 
significant, positive effects. Or perhaps the need is just for improved communication 
capability (e.g., public radio broadcasts, satellite phones, etc.).  
 
c) Complex property rights in livestock restrict pastoralists' capacity to sell-off animals, 
either because they received the animals as gifts or loans—especially from relations 
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who may have some expectation of future reciprocity—or because of intra-household 
gender or generational disputes over who has the authority to make sales decisions. 
  
d) Competition in livestock marketing channels is insufficient to provide reliable, 
remunerative prices for pastoralists. This may be because: (i) traders have insufficient 
information to find where there are healthy animals ready for purchase; (ii) traders’ 
transport costs make traveling to pastoralists unprofitable; (iii) traders have 
insufficient access to transactional credit to operate at efficient scale; (iv) a lack of 
easily enforceable contract law, clan and ethnic ties drive inefficient exchange, 
thereby making it difficult for new entrants to compete with incumbents in the 
marketing channel; or  due to (v) institutional arrangements of sales (e.g., dyadic 
versus auction markets). If market power is the issue, then changed institutional 
arrangements (e.g., introducing auctions more broadly) or start-up loans or transport 
subsidies for new entrants may be effective.  If market power derives from 
ethnic/clan/social ties, it may be difficult to break without subsidization of 
competitors or the creation of herder marketing cooperatives.  
 
e) Poor communications and transport infrastructure and high risk of livestock theft 
create transactions costs that are so high as to wipe out any gains from trekking 
animals to market to sell.  If this is true, it would signal that improving roads or police 
protection are the keys to more responsive marketed off-take.  
 
f) Pastoral herd structures are fragile, with most herders keeping a high share of 
reproductive stock that is difficult to restock commercially when range conditions 
improve. Moreover, restocking typically has to draw on imported animals from other 
areas whose breeds may not be well-adapted to local range or epidemiological 
conditions.  Introducing such animals into herds may also dilute valued local 
genotypes. Such a finding would point toward the need for improved herd 
management advisories as well as coordinated commercial breeding and distribution 
systems that attend to locally adapted traits. 
 
g) National policies with respect to both cross-border movement of people and animals 
and control of domestic animal diseases through movement restrictions and 
quarantines disrupt the natural flow of animals from rangeland areas with a surplus of 
cattle to highland areas exhibiting chronic excess demand for livestock.  If such 
policies restrict pastoral marketing responsiveness, this would suggest a need for 
policy reforms aimed at finding alternative means to combat infectious animal disease 
and to stem cross-border violence and trafficking in contraband. 
 
In summary, these are merely hypotheses, albeit ones informed by significant field observation 
and prior research.  However, any effort to try to induce greater marketed off-take in response to 
variable range and animal conditions depends fundamentally on which, if any, of them are true 
and what is done to ameliorate the hypothesized constraints that are truly binding.  It is also 
likely that constraints vary across time and space, hence the need for a spatial dimension to the 
research.   
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By establishing which hypotheses appear true – and which seem false, at least in the time and 
places we study – one can then begin to evaluate the likely effects of alternative policy or project 
interventions intended to stimulate increasingly responsive pastoral marketing. Figure 2 reflects 
the connection between the hypothesized constraints on pastoralist or trader behavior and 
prospective interventions to be evaluated through the simulation modeling component of the 
project. 
Table 1 
 
Constraints on Candidate Interventions to Increase Marketing Response 
Pastoralist Behavior Trader Behavior  
a)  no safe place to save 
cash 
limited transactional 
credit available to 
traders 
- Promote pastoral banking 
institutions 
b)  insufficient reliable 
climate or price forecasts 
insufficient reliable 
climate or price 
forecasts 
- Price and forage/livestock 
condition reporting systems 
- Improved communications 
technologies linked to early 
warning systems and markets 
c)  complex property rights 
in animals inhibit sales  
-      Change in laws 
d)  low and variable prices 
for animals sold 
high transport costs, 
variability in terminal 
market prices, limited 
transactional credit, 
social networks 
paramount 
  
-    Transport subsidies, road 
improvements 
- Trader credit facilities and 
bonding/guarantees 
- Improved enforcement of 
contracts 
- Replace dyadic markets with 
auctions 
- Pastoral marketing 
cooperatives 
e)  high costs/risks of 
moving animals to market 
 high transport costs, 
risk of banditry during 
transit 
- Road improvements 
- Improved police protection 
f)  fragile herd structures 
inhibit marketed offtake or 
restocking 
 
- Extension services on herd 
composition and structure 
- Promote breed-specific 
stocking/restocking programs 
 
g)  border closures and 
domestic movement 
restrictions and quarantines 
border closures and 
domestic movement 
restrictions and 
quarantines 
- Develop alternative animal 
disease control methods 
- Relax cross-border trade 
restrictions 
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II. DATA 
 
This report is based on repeat-visit survey data collected on a quarterly basis over a two-year 
period beginning in June 2000 and ending in June 2002.  In June 2002, we supplemented the 
usual survey instrument – which included detailed information on marketed offtake behavior and 
a wide range of other data on household and herd status – with a detailed module to gather more 
precise information on recent livestock marketing transactions.  A total of 330 households were 
randomly sampled from 11 different sites, six in northern Kenya (Dirib Gombo, Kargi, 
Logologo, Ngambo, North Horr and Suguta Marmar) and five in southern Ethiopia (Dida Hara, 
Dillo, Finchawa, Qorate and Wachille). The sites were chosen to capture variation in agricultural 
potential, market access, livestock mobility and ethnic diversity. As shown in Table 2, the study 
area spread over an area of approximately 124,000km2 and spanned several ethnic groups, 
including the Ariaal, Boran, Chamus, Gabra, Gurji, Rendille, and Samburu. 
 
Table 2 
 
Code Name Country Market 
Access 
Ethnic 
Majority
Agricultural 
Potential 
Annual 
Rainfall 
DG Dirib Gombo Kenya Medium Boran High 650 
KA Kargi Kenya Low Rendille Low 200 
LL Logologo Kenya Medium Ariaal Medium-
Low 
250 
NG Ng’ambo Kenya High Il Chamus High 650 
NH North Horr Kenya Low Gabra Low 150 
SM Sugata 
Marmar 
Kenya High Samburu Medium 500 
 
DH Dida Hara Ethiopia Medium Boran Medium  500 
DI Dillo Ethiopia Low Boran Low  400 
FI Finchawa Ethiopia High Guji High  650 
QO Qorate Ethiopia Low Boran Low  450 
WA Wachille Ethiopia Medium Boran Medium  550 
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Figure 2 
 
 
 
Table 3 presents the number of households for which data were collected, by site and survey 
round.1  The first group of six sites are located in Kenya.  The latter group of five are Ethiopian. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 Numbers vary across rounds a bit due to temporary absence (e.g., due to long distance trekking), respondent 
mortality, replacement and other survey management details.  
Survey Sites in 
Southern Ethiopia and Northern Kenya
$Z
$Z
$Z
$Z
$Z
$Z
$Z
$Z
$Z
$Z
$Z
#Y
#Y
#Y
#Y
#Y
#Y
#Y
#Y
#Y
Negelle
Hagere Mariam
Yabello
Mega
Moyale
Marsabit
Marigat
Maralal
Isiolo
Dillo
Kargi
Ngambo
Qorate
Wachille
Finchawa
Logologo
Dida Hara
North Horr
Dirib Gumbo
Suguta 
Marmar
Major Roads
$Z Survey Sites
#Y Major Towns
100 0 100 200 300 Kilometers
N
EthiopiaSudan
Kenya
Central
African
Republic
Tanzania
UgandaCongo
Som alia
Rwanda
Burundi
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  Jun-00 Sep-00 Dec-00 M ar-01 Jun-01 Sep-01 Dec-01 M ar-02 Jun-02
Dirib  Go mbo  31 31 28 31 31 31 31 31 31 
Karg i 30 30 30 30 30 30 32 30 30 
Logo  Logo  30 30 28 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Nga mbo  30 30 29 30 30 31 31 31 31 
North  Horr 30 30 28 30 30 29 31 29 29 
Sugu ta 
M armar 30 30 27 30 30 30 30 30 30 
           
Dida Hara 30 30 30 30 30 30 31 30 30 
Dillo  30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Finchawa 31 31 30 31 31 31 29 31 30 
Qorate 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
W ach ille 30 30 30 30 30 30 28 30 30 
  
Data collection was conducted by one pair of carefully trained enumerators (male and female) in 
each site, closely supervised by two field-based postdoctoral fellows. The enumerators all had 
high school education and spoke at least two languages, including one local language in the 
study area. 
 
The repeated quarterly survey conducted by the PARIMA project in northern Kenya and 
southern Ethiopia provided the sampling framework for the Livestock Marketing module. This 
module was fielded in June through July 2002 along with the final quarterly repeat round of the 
PARIMA survey. The survey elicited information from pastoralists on their ranking of places 
where they prefer to sell or buy livestock and who they prefer to trade with when selling or 
buying livestock. The instrument also asked about sources of market information, how these 
sources are ranked in terms of importance and how frequently information is sought from them. 
Depending on whether they had bought or sold livestock respondents were asked to recall 
additional information on livestock marketed between January and December 2001. Information 
obtained from respondents during the repeat quarterly surveys conducted in March, June, 
September and December 2001 (for example, on livestock species, gender, age; price sold 
(bought); month of sale (purchase)) were used to assist respondent recall.  Questions asked in 
this segment included where an animal was sold or purchased (e.g., market, on the way to the 
market, at the base camp or at the satellite camp), whether the animal was trekked or trucked to 
or from the market and by whom, whether a cost was incurred to trek or truck the animal to or 
from the market, and whether the purchase or sell price was higher, the same or lower than what 
was expected.  
 
 
Table 3: Number of Household Survey Participants 
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III DATA ANAYLSIS METHODS 
 
Data analysis in this report follows two lines of inquiry.  First, we use results from published 
project papers to address some issues.  These papers involve a mix of qualitative and quantitative 
data collection and analysis methods.  We supplement these findings with new, regression-based 
analysis in order to test simultaneously several hypotheses  with respect to the determinants of 
livestock marketing patterns.  As we are examining quarterly livestock sales and purchases data 
of 330 households across eleven sites between the period of June 2000 and June 2002, our data 
comprises a panel encompassing both intertemporal and cross-sectional variation.   
 
The regression method we employ is known as a Heckman selection model, after the recent 
Nobel Laureate, Jim Heckman, who pioneered the method’s use in studying market participation 
and market volume decisions jointly.2  Heckman’s method involves a two-stage estimator that 
controls statistically for those factors that affect households’ discrete decision to participate in 
the market or not when estimating the relationship between net livestock sales volume and 
appropriate correlates of the continuous marketed off-take volume decision.  The first equation 
representing household participation in the market takes the form: 
 
(1)   mpit =     α + βxit  + εit  
   
where mpit is a dichotomous variable representing market participation, with 
mpit = 1, if the household participated in the livestock market during time period t, and 
mpit = 0, if the household did not participate during time period t. 
xit  is a vector of household specific variables including initial household herd size – as measured 
in tropical livestock units (TLUs)3 – ownership as reported in the baseline survey, percentage of 
initial herd that is female, percentage of initial herd encumbered with complex property rights, 
average log price of smallstock and largestock during the quarter in the local market, average 
marketing fees associated with taking smallstock and largestock to the local market, insecurity 
and quarantine dummy variables, a dummy variable equaling one if the respondent owned a bank 
account, as well as quarter-specific dummy variables.  Finally, εit  is a normally distributed error 
term with mean zero and constant variance σ2, independently and identically distributed (iid) 
across observations. 
 
We note in particular the construction of three binary variables: insecurity, quarantine, and bank.    
Both the insecurity and quarantine dummy variables were constructed from community surveys 
fielded monthly from June 2000 to June 2001.  Key informants were used to ascertain average 
prices in the area for staple goods, rainfall information, the number of traders present in market, 
incidents of insecurity, and quarantines in effect.  Responses were aggregated to the quarterly 
level, so that a one value for the insecurity variable for June 2000 means an at least one incident 
of insecurity occurred in the community between the months of April, May, and June of 2002.  
Both variables are locally defined and potentially variable across sites.  The bank variable was 
                                                          
2 Heckman’s seminal work concerned labor market participation and hours worked decisions, but the methods 
transfer directly and appropriately to the questions we study. 
3 TLUs are a convenient way to compare livestock quantities across species.  One TLU is equivalent to one head of 
cattle, 10 goats, 11 sheep, or 0.7 camel. 
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constructed from the PARIMA household head surveys.  The variable takes the value ‘1’ if at 
any point during the survey period the household held a bank account, and the value ‘0’ 
otherwise.  
 
Location dummies are included in the vector of independent variables and serve to identify the 
selection equation.  While location impacts the decision to market animals or not by virtue of site 
specific characteristics such as population density and average distance to market, by assumption 
it does not affect the second-stage decision of how many animals to take to market conditional 
on participating in the market and other correlates of the continuous off-take equation, which we 
now describe.    
   
Conditional upon having selected into the livestock market for any given quarter, we then regress 
the net TLUs marketed, i.e. sales minus purchases in TLU,  upon the same vector of variables as 
above complemented by a vector of site specific dummy variables.  In this equation, we have 
 
(2)  yit = α + βzit + δit,     
 
where yit is a continuous variable equal to household i’s net purchases, in TLUs, in time period t.  
This variables is therefore positive if the household is a net buyer of livestock, negative if the 
household is a net seller.  The regressors, zit, are a vector of correlates of livestock off-take 
volumes, including the variables in xit in the first-stage equation, minus the location dummies. δit  
is the error term, uncorrelated with εit , and distributed iid N(0, σ2). 
 
The regression was run three times to compensate for absences of reporting for certain variables.  
Of the 3038 total observations, the marketing fees data were missing for 1011 observations, 
representing all households at all sites between June 2000 and December 2000.  Insecurity and 
quarantine information was not available from Dirib Gombo, Kargi, Logo Logo, North Horr, 
Dida Hara, Dillo, Finchawa, and Qorate from September 2001 through March 2002.  In addition, 
this community level information was reported in the last quarter only by Ngambo, North Horr 
and Suguta Marmar.  In total, 983 observations are missing insecurity and quarantine 
information.  Complete information was available for 1039 observations, including data from all 
sites between the March 2001 to June 2001, and for some of the sites between September 2001 
and the end of the survey period.  To compensate for the lack of data, we ran the above equations 
in three groups: first with 1039 observations with all variables accounted for, the second without 
the insecurity and quarantine information with the observations missing these data combined 
with the observations for which all data were collected, and a third time for the sites lacking 
marketing fee information stacked on top of the data with all variables, this time ignoring 
marketing fees.  
 
The standard mean squared error tradeoffs emerge among these different estimation methods.  
Though the point estimates of the equation with all variables are unbiased and consistent, the 
explanatory power is diminished due to smaller sample size.  For this reason, we focus primarily 
upon the point estimates of these results and emphasize statistical significance less.  In the other 
two formulations, larger sample size leads to more precise estimates.  But the omitted relevant 
variables bias created by dropping information results in inconsistent and biased coefficient 
estimates.  The incomplete nature of the data complicates interpretation of the results.   We 
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derive our conclusions based upon the consistency of the sign of the coefficients and the overall 
significance of the variables in the three formulations.  For example, if a coefficient is negative 
in all three equations and statistically significant in the two equations with larger sample size, but 
not significant in the first specification, we focus upon the magnitude of the unbiased result and 
find justification for statistical significance from the other two equations.  The approach can be 
summarized as piecing together a coherent story as described by all three equations as opposed 
to having an a priori high degree of confidence in any one of them.  Detailed results from the 
regression are reported in Appendix 1.       
 
 
IV.  BASIC DESCRIPTION OF MARKETING BEHAVIOR 
 
 
During the survey period, we found that far from being autarkic, greater than nine out of ten 
pastoralist households in our survey sample used livestock markets at some point during the 
survey period.  Market participation is defined as using the market either to purchase or to sell 
livestock.  As seen in Table 4, market participation varies over time, with fewer households 
participating in livestock trading during the quarter of June 2002 as opposed to June 2000, with 
the exception of Qorate.  The need to market animals was particularly high in June 2000, as we 
began the survey during one of the worst droughts in years.  Note that each survey captures a 
three-month interval, therefore participating in the market in June 2000 is defined as either 
selling or buying livestock via the market at least once between April and June 2000. We can see 
this pinnacle of market participation most clearly in Figure 3a, which graphs market participation 
in Kenya over time, by site.   
 
 
Jun-
00 
Sep-
00 
Dec-
00 
Mar-
01 
Jun-
01 
Sep-
01 
Dec-
01 
Mar-
02 
Jun-
02   
HHs Marketing 
Livestock 
during Survey 
Period 
Dirib Gombo 68% 42% 21% 19% 10% 26% 29% 19% 0%  97% 
Kargi 70% 37% 40% 20% 47% 60% 28% 40% 33%  97% 
Logo Logo 43% 47% 25% 37% 30% 13% 37% 7% 7%  87% 
Ngambo 43% 40% 41% 43% 30% 13% 6% 6% 3%  87% 
North Horr 53% 50% 54% 27% 67% 41% 45% 24% 17%  94% 
Suguta Marmar 60% 40% 30% 40% 13% 33% 23% 47% 7%  90% 
Kenya Weighted Avg 56% 43% 35% 31% 33% 31% 28% 24% 11%  92% 
             
Dida Hara 57% 37% 23% 20% 23% 27% 39% 30% 37%  90% 
Dillo 43% 33% 20% 23% 17% 17% 33% 33% 30%  87% 
Finchawa 58% 48% 73% 45% 48% 32% 45% 10% 7%  100% 
Qorate 13% 23% 0% 20% 20% 0% 23% 3% 33%  63% 
Wachille 30% 37% 20% 43% 20% 20% 32% 33% 23%  93% 
Ethiopia Weighted Avg 40% 36% 27% 30% 26% 19% 34% 22% 26%   87% 
 
Table 4: Percentage of HHs Participating in the Livestock Market, by Quarter and Site 
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AV ERA GE 
SITE 
TLU /H H 
LA R GES TO CK  
%TLU 
SMALLS TO CK  
%TLU 
D irib Go mbo 13.3 92% 8% 
K argi 30.6 71% 29% 
Lo go Lo go 21.3 85% 15% 
N ga mbo 6.6 47% 53% 
N orth Horr 25.6 68% 32% 
Suguta 
Marma r 13.3 78% 22% 
      
D ida Hara 15.5 95% 5% 
D illo 45.1 84% 16% 
Finc hawa 14.7 96% 4% 
Q orate 13.2 99% 1% 
W achille 15.3 98% 2% 
 
 
 
Figures 3a,b: Number of HH Livestock Market Participants
Kargi and North Horr tend to have 
the highest rates of market 
participation amongst the six Kenyan 
sites, which is to be expected as these 
sites are the most pastoralist of the 
sample.  The pastoralist nature of 
these sites is reflected in the number 
of animals owned by the survey 
participants.  As Table 5 shows, 
Kargi and North Horr respondents 
have the highest average herd size 
amongst the Kenyan sites.     
 
Since it requires between 3 and 5 
TLU per capita to sustain herders on 
milk and blood on the open range 
(Lybbert et al, forthcoming), fewer 
animals tends to indicate 
sedentarization.  For example, 
respondents in Ngambo, a site with 
relatively high agricultural potential 
and a diversified economy, have the 
lowest average herd size of the 
Kenyan sites, and consequentially a 
lower rate of livestock market 
participation.     
Table 5 also illustrates the necessity of 
species diversity in areas of pure 
pastoralism, the more arid areas, void of 
agriculture and characterized by highly 
variable rainfall.  The sites with high 
TLU ownership and low agricultural 
potential, Kargi, North Horr, and Dillo, 
all hold a significant percentage of their 
animals in smallstock, a term to describe 
small ruminants such as goats and 
sheep, as goats in particular are highly 
drought resistant.  As might be inferred, 
largestock refers to larger animals such 
as cattle and camel.  Sites with a high 
percentage of smallstock and a low 
average TLU, e.g., Ngambo, suggest a 
more settled lifestyle with smallstock 
providing supplemental milk, as 
opposed to subsistence.       
Table 5: Average Site TLU and Herd Composition 
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In their analysis of livestock income and non-livestock income, McPeak and Little (forthcoming) 
show that non-livestock income sources provide the majority of income for three of our Kenya 
sites: Logologo, Ngambo, and Sugata Marmar (Figure 4).  These three sites not only have higher 
income than the sites where income from livestock accounts for the majority of income, but these 
households have better access to markets and infrastructure, and enjoy higher and more 
diversified incomes.  These households also tend to be characterized by a greater degree of 
sedentarization and decreased mobility, although there are important exceptions to this tendency. 
 
Figure 4: Total Income Reported Over a Three-Month Period 
Source: McPeak and Little, forthcoming 
Note: $1 ≈ Kshs75 
 
 
 
 
 
QUARTERS 
REPORTING 
LIVESTOCK 
MARKETING 
ACTIVITY 
% OF 
RESPONDENTS, 
KENYA 
% OF 
RESPONDENTS, 
ETHIOPIA 
MEAN TLU OF 
MARKET 
PARTICIPANTS 
0 9% 13%           10.78  
1 19% 19%           15.59  
2 23% 21%           14.47  
3 16% 19%           19.58  
4 12% 16%           19.70  
5 6% 5%           35.72  
6 9% 4%           30.28  
7 4% 3%           45.86  
8 1% 1%           48.30   
One point emerging early in our 
analysis comes from comparing 
the average livestock holdings of 
respondents differing by levels of 
market participation. Table 6 
shows that the more active 
participants in livestock markets 
have higher average livestock 
holdings.  Autarkic households 
own an average of 10.8 TLUs, as 
opposed to the households most 
active in markets, which average 
holdings of over 40 TLUs.  
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Regression analysis confirms not only that greater livestock holdings results in greater livestock 
market participation, but that it also has an impact upon the numbers of livestock marketed.  The 
sole variable consistently statistically significant and in all three equations, was total livestock 
holdings.  In addition, the negative regression coefficient estimate implies that the greater the 
livestock holdings, the greater the capacity and willingness to sell animals.  The key practical 
implication is that active livestock markets depend on pastoralists attaining and maintaining 
sufficiently large herd sizes that they become willing to liquidate animals through the market.   
 
It is generally believed that pastoralists sell their animals at least partly in response to demand for 
cash to meet expenditure needs.  Livestock thus serves as a “bank on hooves” as well as a 
productive asset.  In this region of northern Kenya, a household of average size needs 
approximately 500 Kshs per month to provide a regular supply of consumption goods, such as 
maize, tea, and sugar, in addition to lumpy, seasonal needs such as school fees.  Relatively 
wealthy pastoralists, with greater herd size, have considerably higher expenditure rates (Barrett 
and McPeak, 2003) and thus use livestock markets more frequently to cash out animals.  When 
livestock prices are rising in the post-drought period, the wealthier households are able to sell 
surplus animals and take advantage of favorable prices, while poorer households tend to hold on 
to their few animals remaining after the drought, unless forced to sell by consumption needs. 
 
Despite the prevalence of relatively wealthy participants in the livestock market, ironically, it is 
the poorer households who rely on market purchases for restocking, as they do not have 
sufficient scale of herd size for breeding operations (Little et al., 2003).  In contrast, wealthier 
pastoral households rely almost exclusively on natural reproduction, perhaps purchasing 
livestock to diversify risk by investing in alternate types or species of livestock..       
 
 
 
The ASAL regions are net exporters of animals, as reflected in net sales of livestock.  But 
volumes are relatively low per household, limiting their incorporation into broader national and 
international trade patterns.  Market participants were generally net sellers of livestock , not net 
buyers.  As Table 7 shows, in both Kenya and Ethiopia, the average marketed transaction was a 
Table 7: Average Quarterly Net TLU of Livestock Market Participants 
    Jun-00 Sep-00 Dec-00 Mar-02 Jun-02 Sep-02 Dec-02 Mar-03 Jun-03
KENYA average net tlu -0.7 -0.6 -0.5 -0.8 -0.4 -0.5 -0.6 -0.2 -0.3 
  
% of HHs 
participating in 
livestock market 56.35% 42.54% 35.29% 30.94% 32.60% 30.94% 28.11% 23.76% 11.05%
ETHIOPIA average net tlu -0.9 -1.1 -0.9 -0.9 -0.9 -1.8 -0.9 -0.1 -0.9 
  
% of HHs 
participating in 
livestock market 40.40% 35.76% 27.33% 30.46% 25.83% 19.21% 34.46% 21.85% 26.00%
TOTALaverage net tlu -0.8 -0.8 -0.7 -0.9 -0.6 -1.0 -0.7 -0.1 -0.7 
  
% of HHs 
participating in 
livestock market 49.10% 39.46% 31.56% 30.72% 29.52% 25.60% 30.93% 22.89% 17.82%
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net sale. Over the course of the study period, of the 918 quarterly observations of market 
participation, 815 net sellers were recorded, as opposed to only 92 net buyers, while 11 
households netted zero in their quarterly market transactions.  If we consider net market 
transactions across the two year survey period, 271 of 337, or 80% of households participated as 
net sellers, as opposed to just 8% of households who purchased more TLUs than they sold, 
behaving as net buyers.  11% of households did not participate at in the livestock markets at all.   
 
But one of the most striking features of Table 7 is the small average net sale quantity.  In no 
period was the average household transaction more than 1 TLU over the course of a quarter.  
These data underscore the limited immediate gains to be reaped from generalized stimulus to 
regional and international livestock markets because ASAL pastoralist households are not heavy 
net sellers of animals. 
 
Table 8: Births and Purchases in TLUs Across Species, by Quarter 
 
  
Camel 
Births, 
TLU 
Camel 
Pu rchases, 
TLU 
Pu rchases  as a 
% of gross 
herd 
re cruitmen t 
Cattle  
Births , 
TLU 
Cattle  
Pu rchases , 
TLU 
Pu rchases as a 
% of gross 
herd 
re cruitmen t 
Smallstock 
Births , 
TLU 
Smallstock 
Pu rchases, 
TLU 
Pu rchases as  a 
% of gross he rd 
re cruitmen t 
Jun-00 117.3 0.0 0.00% 168.0 49.0 22.58% 67.8 5.0 6.87% 
Sep-00 24.3 1.4 5.56% 99.0 11.0 10.00% 31.0 2.9 8.55% 
Dec-00 80.1 7.2 8.20% 113.0 7.0 5.83% 51.7 2.3 4.26% 
Mar-01 70.1 2.9 3.92% 105.0 12.0 10.26% 122.0 2.2 1.77% 
Jun-01 62.9 1.4 2.22% 211.0 2.0 0.94% 153.4 1.6 1.03% 
Sep-01 38.6 4.3 10.00% 212.0 4.0 1.85% 94.9 2.0 2.06% 
Dec-01 123.0 2.9 2.27% 321.0 11.0 3.31% 119.7 4.1 3.31% 
Mar-02 113.0 1.4 1.25% 343.0 24.0 6.54% 117.9 2.8 2.32% 
Jun-02 127.3 0.0 0.00% 213.0 1.0 0.47% 91.7 0.9 0.97% 
                   
Coeffic ient of Corre lation 
between Births  and 
Purchases  -0.3284     0.0579     -0.2395 
  
 
While pastoralists quite actively use the markets to offload animals, albeit in small quantities and 
primarily to meet immediate cash expenditure needs, restocking is typically relegated to births as 
rather than purchases.  We compare purchases as a percentage of gross herd recruitment 
(purchases plus births) by species across periods in Table 8.  Purchases comprise a relatively 
small share of herd growth.  Note in particular the coefficient of correlation between births and 
purchases as calculated in the final row in Table 8.  There exists a strong negative correlation 
between births and purchases for the dryland species, camels and smallstock, as opposed to a 
very slight positive relationship between cattle births and purchases.  In the drier areas, 
pastoralists appear to use the markets to restock their animals in times when the birth rate is not 
high enough to restock herds back to a viable level.  Part of this surely just reflects species 
differences. Cattle are more fragile and thus both reproduction and purchases increase as cattle 
mortality falls and the carrying capacity of natural resource base recovers.  Camels and 
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smallstock are much more resilient than cattle.  Thus pastoralists can use purchases and births as 
substitute methods of herd restocking.   
 
One can likewise look at the relative importance of markets as regulators of pastoralist herd sizes 
by studying the ratio of purchases to births for restocking and by looking at the ratio of sales to 
deaths.  A higher ratio indicates greater reliance on markets.  We computed these ratios as well 
(not reported) and found that the ratio increases as market access improves, but in no case did 
that ratio approach one.  Biology remains the dominant regulator of pastoralist herd size even in 
the most market-oriented sites in northern Kenya and southern Ethiopia.  
 
 
V. HYPOTHESIS TESTING 
 
In this section, we directly address the seven core hypotheses posed at the outset of this paper 
and captured in Table 1.   
 
A.  NO SAFE SAVINGS REPOSITORY 
Given the dearth of formal financial savings alternatives in the study site, pastoralists rely upon 
their traditional store of wealth, livestock, to accumulate and safeguard their assets.  Not only are 
these assets care-intensive and vulnerable to raids and disease outbreaks, they are also sensitive 
to the low and variable rainfall which characterizes the ASAL.  Some observers therefore 
hypothesize that the introduction of banks might allow pastoralists to diversify their risk, holding 
assets in a different and perhaps safer form (vulnerable to non-trivial fees, institutional instability 
and theft, to be sure, but safe from raids, disease and drought) and that holding a bank account 
should decrease pastoralist reliance upon livestock as a means of asset accumulation, and 
decrease reliance upon the market as a means to liquidate assets for consumption smoothing 
(Desta, 1999). 
 
 
  RESPONDENTS 
BANK 
ACCOUNT 
HOLDERS 
AVERAGE 
SITE TLU 
AVG 
BANK 
HOLDERS 
TLU 
Dirib Gombo 31 2 13.3 22.2 
Kargi 32 2 30.6 14.8 
Logo Logo 30 5 21.3 22.6 
Ngambo 31 2 6.6 9.2 
North Horr 31 15 25.6 25.6 
Suguta Marmar 30 1 13.3 36.0 
       
Dida Hara 31 1 15.5 124.9 
Dillo 30 0 45.1 n/o 
Finchawa 31 1 14.7 4.0 
Qorate 30 0 13.2 n/o 
Wachille 30 0 15.3 n/o 
Total 337 29 19.5 26.0 
 
Table 9: Bank Account Holders and Average TLUs across Sites 
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As shown in Table 9, few pastoralists (8.6%) in our sample held a bank account between March 
2000 and June 2002.  At one level, this makes it difficult to test the hypothesis that increased 
bank-mediated savings could affect livestock marketing patterns, as there is relatively little 
variation in our data.  On the other hand, in a regression context, even this limited use of banks 
can prove significant holding everything else constant.  Moreover, by trying to understand why 
so few pastoralists hold bank accounts we can perhaps uncover useful information relating to the 
role banks play with respect to pastoralist livestock marketing behavior. 
 
Among the study sites, bank accounts were observed most frequently in North Horr.  At this site, 
a Nairobi-based NGO, KREP Development Agency (KDA), opened a Financial Service 
Association (FSA), offering accessible accounts to locals purchasing shares in the cooperative 
constituting the FSA’s loan fund.  Though nearly half of the respondents in the North Horr site 
had bank accounts at some point between June 2000 and June 2002, membership in the FSA 
declined among the sample population between these periods (Table 10).  Only one household in 
our sample maintained an FSA account over the entire two-year survey period.   
 
 
 
  
RESPONDENTS 
WITH BANK 
ACCOUNTS 
NEW 
ACCOUNTS
CLOSED 
ACCOUNTS
Jun-00 8    
Sep-00 4 1 4 
Dec-00 4 0 0 
Mar-01 3 0 1 
Jun-01 4 1 0 
Dec-01 6 2 1 
Mar-02 4 1 0 
Jun-02 7 2 3 
  
If banks indeed assist pastoralists in risk management, it is natural to ask why FSA membership 
among North Horr respondents declines over time.  Osterloh (2001) found that the value of 
North Horr FSA shares declined in value by 50% from 1997 to 2000, due to an extraordinarily 
high rate of loan default.  Far from providing a secure repository of cash, the FSA actually 
decreased shareholder wealth.        
 
It is not only community-based non-commercial banks where participants suffer asset loss.  
McPeak (2003) finds that Chalbi herds measured in TLU terms returned an average annual rate 
of 6% from early 1993 and early 1997 (standard deviation 0.11, 28% of households experienced 
negative rates), while Dukana herds averaged 15% annualized livestock rates of return over the 
same period (standard deviation of 0.15, 12% of households experienced negative rates).  
Contrasting these livestock rates of return with the returns to formal bank-mediated savings in 
the study area illustrates why capital held as livestock is preferred to capital held in formal 
savings.  Given current banking regulations at the nearest formal bank in the district capital, 
Marsabit, a cash deposit the equivalent of roughly 25 goats’ value or more would return 
Table 10: FSA Accounts in North Horr 
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approximately 2% per-year over a four-year period, between 18 and 25 goats would yield a 
return of negative 44 %, and an account of lower value than 18 goats would be completely 
dissipated by service charges in four year’s time, earning a rate of return of negative 100%.  The 
positive rate of return threshold herd of 25 goats is roughly 10% of average household herd size, 
and is equivalent to more than half of the average household’s total livestock sales over the four 
year study period.  Even including the losses of late 1996, and excluding the benefits of income 
generation and the costs associated with accessing savings in the district capital, livestock raising 
offers a higher average rate of return than savings.  While it could be argued that formal banking 
may still be attractive in terms of reduced variance in return, discussions with herders suggest 
viewing bank savings as low risk may not be appropriate as herders express doubts about the 
safety of money placed in banks. 
   
Though statistically insignificant in two of the three regressions, owning a bank account 
consistently has a positive estimated impact upon pastoralists’ probability of participating in the 
livestock market, although since both bank accounts and market participation are positively 
correlated with wealth, it is difficult to determine the direction of causality in this association.  In 
addition, having a bank account at any point in the study period decreases net sales.  Since bank 
account holders can draw upon their financial assets in times of stress, they are better equipped 
to smooth over income shocks without resorting to liquidating assets.  So the positive estimated 
correlation between net purchases and holding a bank account seems to underscore once again 
the role livestock sales play in meeting immediate cash needs, a role for which bank accounts 
can substitute easily.  The implication, of course, is that rather than stimulating marketed 
livestock off-take in order to take advantage of intertemporal fluctuations in range carrying 
capacity and local livestock productivity, as has been hypothesized by advocates of pastoral 
banking, formal bank accounts appear to reduce marketed livestock off-take by supplanting the 
need to use livestock as a buffer stock. Furthermore, the evidence does not support the claim that 
lack of banking options significantly limits livestock marketing.. 
 
 
B.  INSUFFICIENT RELIABLE CLIMATE AND PRICE FORECAST INFORMATION 
 
CLIMATE FORECASTS4 
Just as a skillful cultivator is highly regarded for her ability to predict and react to climate 
variation, conventional wisdom suggests that accurate forecast information should be useful to 
pastoralists who live in areas of characterized by especially pronounced climactic variability 
(with annual rainfall ranging between 200 and 700 mm/year).  The study region has suffered 
three significant droughts in the last decade alone, resulting in massive herd deaths.  Reliance 
upon the herd for sustenance, dearth of agricultural alternatives, and a notoriously poor 
infrastructure render pastoralists’ livelihoods and behavior particularly vulnerable to climate 
fluctuations (Sandford 1983, Ellis and Swift 1988).  Through the timely provision of information 
on upcoming rains, accurate climate forecasts have the potential to inform pastoralists’ stock 
movement and marketing decisions based upon favorable locations for pasture and water 
household risks.  Considerable resources have been directed toward building up climate 
forecasting and dissemination capacity in the region, with the Drought Monitoring Centre 
                                                          
4 This section draws heavily upon  Luseno et al. (2003) and Lybbert et al. (2003). 
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(DMC) in Nairobi the nexus of such efforts (Curry 2001).  Highly advanced early warning 
systems are being developed predicated upon the assumption that climate forecasts will assist 
pastoralists in risk mitigation.   
 
No studies have addressed the suitability of these systems to inform pastoralists and the effects 
of enriched climate information on pastoralists’ decision making processes.  To fill the gap 
between climate forecasting and pastoralists’ utilization of such information, we fielded the first 
round of a household survey module on climate expectations and use of climate forecast 
information in March 2001, prior to the onset of the long rains.  Between June and July 2001, the 
follow-up module was implemented (Luseno et al., 2003).  This survey followed upon the heels 
of a severe drought, one of the worst in the Horn of Africa in many years.  Having just endured 
an acute drought, pastoralists were sensitive to the upcoming season’s rainfall, rendering our 
survey instrument particularly relevant.       
 
Our survey found that modern seasonal forecasts, such as those issued by the DMC in Nairobi, 
though disseminated via newspapers, television, extension agents, and radio, are received by a 
mere 20% of households in our survey area.  Radio is the predominant method of modern 
forecast broadcasting, as other media are infrequently accessible, with none reaching more than 
three percent of the pastoralist population.  As only 23% of the Kenyan households and 5% of 
the Ethiopian households in our survey own a radio, material constraints place an upper bound 
upon the number of pastoralists who are able to receive radio-disseminated forecasts.  In seven of 
the ten sites, a majority of those sampled either did not have access to a radio or were not aware 
that forecasts were available on the radio.       
 
Lack of radios and DMC forecasts does not imply that pastoralists are ill-informed regarding 
climate.  Pastoralists have a long and varied tradition of indigenous climate forecasting.  In our 
sample, a broad spectrum of traditional forecasts methods ranging from animal and wildlife 
behavior observation to intestine interpretation were received by greater than 90% of 
respondents.  Respondents typically had a high degree of confidence in these predictions, though 
some methods inspire more widespread confidence than others.  Most respondents received 
traditional forecasts from multiple sources, reflecting that that the suite of traditional methods 
elicits confidence from the overwhelming majority of the regions pastoralists.  The average 
overall confidence in traditional forecasts was 77%, far surpassing confidence in modern 
forecasts, which registered a mere 23%.  Though there existed much site variation, in 10 of the 
11 survey locations, confidence in traditional forecasts exceeded that for modern forecasts.  In 
general, Kenyan respondents were more trusting of modern, computer-based forecasts than their 
Ethiopian counterparts.   
 
Though indigenous climate forecasts dominate, a nontrivial cohort of pastoralists are interested 
in hearing external forecasts because they have both access to and confidence in them.  
Respondents in Kenya are more likely to have access to and confidence in external forecasts, as 
are those who reside near a town or major highway.  Location of residence or work determines 
who receives information about meteorology-based climate forecasts, with more favored areas 
getting better information.  In addition, educational attainment plays a significant role as well.  
Since greater educational attainment is associated with higher and more stable cash incomes, this 
implies the same type of wealth bias frequently found in technology adoption studies.  Climate 
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forecasts based on meteorological science appear to be reaching a relative elite that has 
sedentarized and enjoys good market access and non-pastoral income within the drylands of 
northern Kenya and southern Ethiopia. 
 
When asked what type of forecast information pastoralists deemed most useful, respondents 
overwhelmingly regarded knowing the start date for the rainy season as most valuable variable of 
interest.  The amount of rainfall in their home area, the end date or duration of the rainy season, 
and the rainfall in areas they might migrate were also considered important forecasts.  In regards 
to timing, respondents living in drier locales regarded four to five weeks of advance notice as 
ideal to take forecasts into account.  In wetter climes where agriculture is practiced, the lead time 
for a forecast to be useful extends to eight or ten weeks.  This is consistent with similar results 
among farmers in Burkina Faso, where Roncoli et al. (2002) likewise found that farmers sought 
forecasts one to two full months prior to the onset of the rainy season.  Unfortunately, it is not 
clear whether climate modelers will have the capacity to offer long-lead timing forecasts in the 
coming few years (Goddard et al., 2001). 
 
The biggest impediment to fulfilling the potential of forecasts is the transformation of acquired 
modern information into behavior modification.  Information is valuable in so far as people are 
willing and able to act upon it.  If people either cannot or will not change behavior in response to 
information they receive, then the information has no practical value.  Despite the stated 
confidence in traditional forecasts, surprisingly few respondents altered their behavior after 
receiving forecasts.  Only about one quarter of our respondents changed their behavior on the 
basis of the forecast start dates for the 2001 long rains, while fewer than ten percent of those who 
received external forecasts of rainfall volumes in their own locations adjusted behavior in 
response.   
 
In a companion piece to the Luseno et al. study, Lybbert et al. (2003) investigate whether this 
lack of response is due to an inability of pastoral populations to comprehend probabilistic 
forecasts.  This study addresses the hypothesis that the lack of a change in production practices 
observed resulted from an inability to understand and process the information contained in 
climate forecasts by the recipients.  This hypothesis is rejected, as it appears that recipients 
update their prior beliefs based on new information as is predicted by the literature on the 
economics of information.  The provisional hypothesis advanced to explain the relatively minor 
impact of forecasts on production practices is that the built in flexibility of pastoral production in 
response to rainfall makes it largely unnecessary to react to a forecast ex ante. 
 
Of those who did alter their behavior based upon forecasts, most changes were with respect to 
cultivation practices, rather than herd management strategies.  Since crop production systems 
require strategies based upon climate expectation, such as choice of crops and planting decisions, 
cultivators are inclined to employ climate forecasts.   Pastoralists, on the other hand, move their 
herds based upon scouting reports of realized rainfall and range conditions in lands they have 
access to, rather than on the basis of forecasts.  As opposed to sedentarized agriculture 
characterized by limited flexibility once crops are chosen and planted, highly adaptable livestock 
systems adjust to spatial-temporal variation in range conditions through migration.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
20
Since crop cultivation is growing rapidly among the stockless pastoralists settled around towns 
where cropping is ecologically feasible (Little et al., 2001), climate forecasting may be of 
greatest potential benefit to these dispossessed subpopulations in transition.  In the longer term, it 
may be that the emergence of reliable and accessible seasonal forecasts at appropriate spatial 
scale may help foster some shift from more flexible pastoralist production systems to potentially 
higher return sedentarized production systems in semi-arid areas where sufficient water can be 
tapped to support such strategies.  However in arid areas and in the short term until technological 
limitations are overcome and long-lead spatially-specific forecasts can be made, there do not 
exist viable alternatives to the highly flexible system of semi-nomadic grazing.  In this context, 
the value of computer-generated climate forecast information appears quite low.   
 
Our evidence suggests that climate information is not a particularly limiting factor to 
pastoralists’ livestock marketing behavior.  Though few respondents received modern forecasts, 
confidence in traditional forecasts outweighed confidence in modern forecasts by a three to one 
factor, and despite the high degree of confidence in traditional forecasts, few respondents 
changed their behavior in response to the additional information garnered.  This evidence calls 
into question arguments that improved production and dissemination of climate forecasts should 
be a high priority investment as donors and governments strive to reduce pastoralists’ 
vulnerability to climate-related shocks.  Rather, greater attention needs to be given to what 
infrastructural and institutional advances are necessary to facilitate the use of climate information 
within the livelihood strategies prevailing in these fragile systems.  East African pastoralists 
appear to place negligible value at present on modern climate forecast information.    
 
PRICE FORECASTS 
 
There does not seem to be a dearth of information about livestock prices in the rangelands of 
northern Kenya and southern Ethiopia either. Respondents to the May-June 2002 household 
livestock marketing survey module were asked to cite up to four market price information 
sources they use and the frequency with which they update the information on livestock prices 
they receive from each source.  On average, respondents received information from two sources, 
1.9 sources in Kenya and 2.1 in Ethiopia.   
 
Respondents gathered information about livestock prices primarily through those whose job it is 
to know about livestock prices and to work the margins, traders (Table 11).   Other prominent 
sources of information are friends, relatives, and livestock brokers.  In our sample, nobody seems 
exempt from livestock price inquisition, including travelers passing through as well as the local 
tax collector.  Interestingly enough, only 24 respondents in our survey inquired after sellers of 
livestock about prices, perhaps reflecting the sensitive nature of livestock and money.  Moreover, 
note that few respondents go to market to observe transactions and collect price information first-
hand.  Rather, people rely on information networks to generate and distribute reliable, timely 
information about market conditions.  Given the range of price information sources used and the 
frequency with which they are consulted (Table 12), one needs to ask precisely what sort of price 
information seems to be missing from the local market in order to justify significant new 
expenditures in support of additional market price information generation and dissemination 
activities. 
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  KENYA ETHIOPIA
Daily 24.32% 6.03% 
Every Few Days 20.27% 10.34% 
Weekly 16.22% 37.07% 
Every Few Weeks 19.59% 15.52% 
Monthly 8.78% 10.34% 
Every Few Months 4.05% 11.21% 
Rarely 2.70% 9.48% 
Never 4.05% 0.00% 
 
 
 
 
 
Traders 56.44% 
Friends 45.45% 
Relatives 38.64% 
Brokers 34.47% 
Others who go to market 13.64% 
Sellers 12.88% 
Producers 11.74% 
Travelers 10.61% 
Go to market 7.20% 
Neighbors 5.30% 
Other 9.47% 
 
 
Table 12 shows that nearly half (45%) of the Kenyan respondents checked on market prices 
either daily or every few days, as opposed to only 16% of respondents in Ethiopia. 80% in Kenya 
and 68% in Ethiopia checked their primary source of information at least every few weeks.  
 
Pastoralists are not the only stakeholders who keep reasonably close tabs on market price 
developments.  Modern technology enables traders to stay abreast of prices in major markets.  As 
Mahmoud (2003) notes:   
 
The availability and use of mobile phones by northern traders in Nairobi makes it easy to communicate to 
their partners in Moyale about current market conditions in Nairobi. It is common to observe Moyale-based 
traders rushing back and forth between the market and phone facilities in Moyale to assess the current 
market conditions before making purchase decisions (p.186). 
 
Many northern Kenyan traders based in Nariobi use mobile phones to call their Moyale-based 
partners to relay information about market prices and to ‘order’ shipments of cattle.  Moyale only 
has land line telecommunications services at present, but plans are underway to extend the 
country’s mobile phone service to the area (Mahmoud, 2003). 
 
 
C.  COMPLEX PROPERTY RIGHTS 
In regards to market potential, borrowed animals or those herded for others are qualitatively 
different than those for which complete, alienable property rights are clearly established.  In the 
study region, animals are often given or loaned to others in times of need.  While the exact 
arrangements of gifts and loans vary subtly across ethnic groups and clans and over time, 
perhaps the most common arrangements give the borrower rights to the milk and any offspring 
born to the borrowed animal(s), while ownership claims over the loaned animal(s) remain with 
the lender.  If in need of cash, a pastoralist must consider ownership of each animal while 
Table 11: Sources of Price Information 
Table 12: Frequency with which Respondents 
Check Primary Price Information Source 
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making decisions as to which livestock assets to liquidate via the market.  We hypothesize that 
traditional livestock loaning and gifting arrangements may constrain pastoralists’ ability to 
market livestock burdened with complex property rights. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 presents these households stacked below households without encumbered animals, 
grouped by initial herd size.  Of the 86 households, encumbered animals constitute 19% of the 
herd, on average.  Animals borrowed are predominantly female.  40 of these 86 households 
received exclusively female animals, and the average household herd size of these respondents 
was 14.8 TLU.  Of the 8 households that claimed only encumbered males, their average TLU 
was significantly higher, 40 TLU.  This seems to reflect the difference between lending female 
animals to poor families, so as to augment milk production to help ensure survival, as opposed to 
lending male animals out to others to herd for reasons of convenience, as when a pastoralist with 
full-time salaried employment invests in a larger herd and loans many of his bulls out to his 
unemployed brother for trekking to distant pasture and water (McPeak and Little forthcoming).   
Figure 6 presents the percentage of household TLU comprised by encumbered animals across 
households arrayed by their initial TLU holdings.   
 
Considering first the households with five or fewer TLUs., we find that 43.5% of their HH herd 
are encumbered females.  These households teetering on the brink of catastrophe receive 
predominantly female animals to provide milk and, hopefully, offspring, thereby augmenting 
income and improving their chances of asset accumulation through herd rebuilding.  Nearly half 
of the total TLU holdings of these households are encumbered, and almost all of these animals 
are females, underscoring the social safety net function of the complex traditions of livestock 
borrowing.  The other recipients of animals encumbered with complex property rights own larger 
herds and receive fewer females relative to the first group.  Owner convenience, as opposed to 
recipient insurance, explains the smaller proportion of encumbered animals to total household 
livestock holdings.   
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We define animals as 
encumbered with complex 
property rights if they are 
borrowed from or herded for 
someone else.   Of the 338 
participants in the household 
survey, 25% had animals 
burdened with complex 
property rights at the time of the 
baseline survey in March 2000.  
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We used our regression model to test whether or not the percentage of a household’s animals 
encumbered has any effect on its market participation or on its net livestock transfers conditional 
on participating in the market.  We find that complex property rights have no statistically or 
economically significant effect on the market participation decision.  The greater the share of 
encumbered animals in one’s herd, however, the lower are a household’s expected net livestock 
sales – a result that proves statistically significant at the 15% level in two of the three 
specifications.  This not only corroborates the intuition that animals encumbered by complex 
property rights related to traditional gifting and loaning arrangements are less likely to be sold, 
these findings are also consistent with the observation that while most encumbered animals are 
female, greater than two-thirds of marketed animals are male (Barrett et al., 2003). 
 
 
D.  LOW AND VARIABLE PRICES FOR ANIMALS SOLD 
 
In corroboration of previous studies such as McPeak (2004), we find an unclear relationship 
between the price of animals and both the decision to market animals as well as the quantity of 
animals marketed.  We included the time and site-specific observations of the log of average 
smallstock and largestock prices in the Heckman regression model.  In the market participation 
decision, the signs of the coefficients corresponding to the log of average prices prove 
inconclusive, equally split between positive and negative, and not statistically significantly 
Figure 6: Percentage of Total Herd Encumbered 
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different from zero.  Similarly, in the regression of net TLUs marketed, the signs of the 
coefficients are once again equally split between positive and negative, and significant in only 
one of the six instances in which log of price appears. 
 
In short, there exists no clear relationship between the price of animals offered on the market and 
marketed offtake.  This results from the forces driving the pastoralist decision to market animals.  
Livestock serve a dual role, providing a store of wealth as an asset, as well as providing a stream 
of income, via milk supply and calving.  As noted by McPeak (2004), both asset shocks and 
income shocks impact herder sales behavior.  During the rains when herds are increasing through 
natural reproduction, herders are more likely to sell animals, as they have greater confidence in 
the size of their future herd, thus rendering some older animals expendable on the market as new 
animals are born to replace them.  In addition to the asset effect, during the rains there is more 
milk, enabling households to meet a greater share of their consumption needs via home produced 
milk, as opposed to selling milk for cash in times of rainfall deficit and milk shortage.  Both sales 
and livestock prices tend to increase with the rains.  Rainfall shocks impact both milk production 
and herd growth, resulting in simultaneous income and asset shocks.   
 
In the opposite direction, low rainfall results in less milk production.  This negative income 
shock pressures pastoralists to market their animals in order to compensate for fallen income.  As 
animals fall victim to drought, the negative asset shock places downward pressure on marketed 
off-take rates as pastoralists struggle to preserve their herd in order to replace the animals lost to 
drought.  Both sales and prices decline as drought hits.  Concurrent income and asset shocks 
related to rainfall (or disease or other external drivers) influence sales, but in countervailing 
directions.  The overall impression of net sales behavior unresponsive to price thus appears to 
mask household response to both income and asset shocks generated by single events such as 
drought.   
 
 
E.  HIGH COSTS AND RISKS OF MOVING ANIMALS TO MARKET 
 
HIGH COSTS 
Due to the poor state of transport and marketing infrastructure in the study region, many 
observers cite high costs of moving animals to market and of traders evacuating animals from 
up-country source markets to terminal markets (e.g., Addis Ababa, Nairobi) as a pervasive 
problem crippling the livestock marketing chain (Bailey et al. 2000, Mahmoud 2003).   
 
In the Livestock Marketing Module survey fielded in May and June of 2002, we collected data 
on the animals bought or sold during the respondent’s most recent trip to market and the cash 
expenses incurred in the process.  We emphasize that we can only discuss cash expenditures, 
which clearly underestimate total economic costs that include the pastoralists’ time, risk, etc.   
 
Marketing costs can be divided between variable and fixed costs, where the former reflects costs 
that increase with each animal sold and the latter reflect costs that affect only the discrete 
decision to participate or not in the market.  High fixed costs create increasing returns to scale in 
livestock marketing, discouraging small volume sales.  High variable costs, by contrast, are scale 
invariant in their effects, serving just to reduce net proceeds from sales.  Variable costs such as 
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animal transport, council fees, and animal health certification, are generally species and market 
specific.  In principle, these fees constitute an unavoidable cost of selling livestock at the market, 
however some markets, such as Kargi, Suguta Marmar, Finchawa, and Wachille, are clearly 
more systematic than others in collecting these fees.  Estimated fixed costs include transporting 
the seller or buyer, food, lodging, bribes, and broker fees, though inherent in the marketing 
process, vary from pastoralist to pastoralist, and with sales volume.  As Table 13 illustrates, 67% 
of Kenyan market participants and 79% of Ethiopian pastoralists in our sample marketing their 
livestock incur some sort of cash costs in their livestock transactions, though the percentage of 
those incurring fees varies greatly by site.  In sites close to large markets, Ng’ambo and Dillo, 
few respondents reported incurring marketing costs, as both sites are close to major markets so 
transportation, food, and lodging costs can be avoided, and the need for veterinary medicines can 
easily be met as the need arises.  In more remote and pastoral sites, such as Kargi, trekking to 
town constitutes a non-negligible investment of time and needs such as medicines might be 
deferred until a trip to town to market livestock. 
 
 
 
  
Res ponden ts 
M arketing  
Lives tock 
To tal 
Res ponden ts  
%  o f 
M arket 
Partic ipan ts  
Incurring  
M arketing  
Fees  
Dirib  Go mbo  18 22 77%  
Karg i 20 20 100%  
Logo  Logo  21 18 83%  
Nga mbo  12 16 6%  
North  Horr 20 20 40%  
Sugu ta M armar 11 11 100%  
To tal Kenya 102 107 67%  
      
Dida Hara 16 17 94%  
Dillo  14 16 25%  
Finchawa 18 9 100%  
W ach ille 20 20 100%  
To tal Eth iop ia 68 62 79%  
 
 
As evinced in Table 14, few of our sample pastoralist households paid to transport animals either 
to or from market either via truck or paying a trekker.  In Ethiopia, only one pastoralist in 
Wachille paid to trek a herd of cattle to market.  No other households incurred cash transport 
costs in marketing, although they certainly spend time taking animals to and from market.  In 
Kenya, more pastoralists paid to trek or truck their animals to market during their last trip, 
though frequency varies with site.  In Dirib Gombo and Ng’ambo, sites close to market, no 
pastoralists paid to transport their animals to market.  In more remote locations such as Kargi and 
North Horr, 26% and 34% respectively of smallstock sold or bought incurred transportation 
expenses.  Kargi was the only Kenyan site where pastoralists hired labor to trek their animals. 
 
Table 13: Percentage of Participants Incurring Marketing Fees 
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Trekking or trucking of animals are not the sole transportation costs borne by pastoralists marketing 
their livestock.  They have to displace themselves as well.  In both Kenya and Ethiopia, the average 
costs of human transportation exceed those of transporting the marketed animals.  The sum of animal 
and human transport costs comprises the largest component of marketing costs in both Ethiopia and 
Kenya, 44% and 60%, respectively (Figure 8).  Improving upon the notoriously poor infrastructure 
would presumably alleviate the high costs of transportation in the region by increasing security, traffic, 
market access, and speed of travel.   
 
Perhaps more striking, and somewhat counter to what seems to be the conventional wisdom in 
donor and policy circles, pastoralist households’ cash expenses in livestock marketing are quite 
low.  As reflected in the two rightmost columns of Table 14, variable costs average less than six 
percent of total revenues in each site – and less than two percent in each of the Ethiopia sites.  
Fixed costs are uniformly larger than variable costs in Ethiopia, but still reasonably modest, at 
less than nine percent of total revenues.  In Kenya, there is considerable spatial variation in fixed 
costs.  With Kargi – a relatively remote site – and Logologo exhibiting the highest fixed costs of 
market participation.  These figures are necessarily an overestimate since most pastoralists 
combine livestock sales or purchases at market with other transactions they need to execute in 
town (e.g., purchase of animal or human medicines, picking up food aid rations, or visiting 
government offices or shops).  The relatively modest levels of fixed costs are likewise reflected 
in the relatively modest size of average transactions – less than two large stock or four small 
stock per transaction in each site – and the absence of any strong correlation between average 
fixed costs and mean livestock marketed per transaction.  Just greater than half (50.5%) of 
marketed transactions are for one animal only.  Figure 7 shows the distribution of transactions 
volumes, underscoring the small lots traded, no matter the species involved.  
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Figures 8a and 8b illustrate that, in percentage terms, marketing costs are relatively greater for 
small stock than large stock, largely reflecting the fact that, small stock marketed outnumber 
large stock marketed by a factor of three to one.  Of the 3041 animals purchased or sold, as 
reported in the repeated household head surveys, 2280 were either goats or sheep.  In more 
remote, drier sites, this factor increases.  In North Horr, for example, 5 large stock were 
marketed, as opposed to 297 small stock.  It is worth noting here that in North Horr, all livestock 
marketed during the course of the survey period were sold; there were no livestock purchases 
among our sample between March 2000 and June 2002. 
Figure 7: Frequency of Marketing Quantities of Camel, Cattle, and Small 
Stock
 
 
 
  
LIVESTOCK 
TYPE 
LIVESTOCK 
MARKETED 
PER 
TRANSACTION 
% PAID TO 
TRANSPORT 
ANIMALS 
AVG COST 
TO 
TRANSPORT 
ANIMAL/HEAD 
(Kshs)  
% 
INCURRING 
COUNCIL 
FEES 
AVG 
COUNCIL 
FEE/HEAD 
(Kshs) 
TOTAL 
AVG 
VARIABLE 
COSTS 
PER 
ANIMAL 
(Kshs)  
TOTAL 
AVG 
FIXED 
COSTS 
PER 
MARKET 
VISIT 
(Kshs) 
VARIABLE 
COSTS 
AS AN 
AVG % 
OF TOTAL 
REVENUE 
FIXED 
COSTS 
AS AN 
AVG % 
OF 
TOTAL 
REVENUE 
Smallstock 1.79 0.0% n/o 72.0% 26 26 Dirib 
Gombo Largestock 1.38 0.0% n/o 72.7% 50 50 0 1.0% 0.0% 
Kargi Smallstock 3.41 75.0% 43.2 100.0% 44 87 
  Largestock 1.33 15.0% 300 25.0% 100 400 54 2.9% 11.1% 
Logo 
Logo Smallstock 1.25 14.3% 50 86.7% 39 89 
  Largestock 1.83 14.3% 150 90.9% 100 250 41 3.4% 17.6% 
Ngambo Smallstock 3.27 0.0% n/o 5.6% 50 50 
  Largestock 1.80 0.0% n/o 0.0% n/o 0 50 0.2% 0.5% 
North 
Horr Smallstock 2.16 70.0% 61.7 43.9% 20 82 
  Largestock 1.00 0.0% n/o 0.0% n/o 0 440 5.4% 0.7% 
Smallstock 1.20 36.4% 42.5 100.0% 36 78 Suguta 
Marmar Largestock 1.00 9.1% 250 100.0% 50 300 24 5.9% 5.1% 
                
Dida 
Hara Smallstock 1.75 0.0% n/o 85.7% 30 30 
  Largestock 1.67 0.0% n/o 100.0% 120 120 16 1.6% 7.4% 
Dillo Smallstock 1.09 0.0% n/o 0.0% n/o 0 
  Largestock 1.40 0.0% n/o 0.0% n/o 0 96 0.0% 1.8% 
Finchawa Smallstock 2.13 0.0% n/o 64.7% 40 40 
  Largestock 1.91 0.0% n/o 100.0% 139 139 19 0.6% 8.9% 
Wachille Smallstock 1.50 0.0% n/o 100.0% 40 40 
  Largestock 1.22 5.0% 100 100.0% 137 237 16 0.5% 7.5% 
 
Table 14: Marketing Costs Incurred, by Cost Category and Site
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The cost of marketing animals relative to the price the animals received on the market varies 
from site to site. For small stock, marketing costs ranged from two percent in areas close to town 
like Dirib Gombo, to 25% in more remote areas like Kargi. Less variation was observed with 
regards to the costs of marketing large stock.  No cash expenses were incurred in both North 
Horr and Ngambo, (recall that only five largestock were marketed in North Horr, and Ngambo 
has a major livestock market in the nearby town of Marigat), with a maximum of 10% of large 
stock price in Wachille.   
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The informal impression that cash marketing costs do not pose a big impediment to livestock 
marketing appears borne out by the econometric analysis.  Marketing costs have no statistically 
FIGURE 8 a,b: Marketing Costs as a Percentage of Average Price 
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significant effect on either market participation or net marketed volumes.  The point estimates 
are quite small for both small stock and large stock and the coefficient estimates are of opposing 
signs for the two. 
 
While marketing costs do not appear to make a big difference for individual pastoralist 
households, they figure prominently in trader behavior and in the spatial correlation of livestock 
prices (Barrett et al. 2003). Mahmoud’s study (2003) highlights the critical role that transport 
costs play in the regional livestock marketing chain.   Most traders in the area indicate transport 
as the single most significant cost constraint.  In one interview recorded by Mahmoud, a trader 
lamented that: 
 “If really this data collection is going to be helpful to us (northern Kenya cattle 
traders), something must be done to stabilize trucking costs. We incur high 
transport costs, which consume a big portion of our profits. When cattle markets 
in Nairobi improve (leading to increased cattle in Moyale), truck owners increase 
transport costs as they wish.” 
The above trader has been in cattle business for only a year and has found the cost of trucking a 
constraint to his commercial progress. These sentiments are shared by the majority of traders 
(Mahmoud 2003: 272). 
 
Figure 9: Livestock Trekking and Trucking Routes 
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Figure 9, from Mahmoud (2003), maps the livestock marketing routes used to move animals 
from southern Ethiopia to Nairobi.  While lorries are regularly filled with animals, especially 
higher value Boran breed cattle, many animals are trekked long distance across the border and 
down to the region’s principal terminal market at Nairobi.  Some of these animals are no doubt 
further evacuated via Mombasa port to international markets.  But the vast majority enter the 
domestic slaughtering and meat marketing channel. 
 
From the perspective of the trader, livestock transportation costs in northern Kenya and southern 
Ethiopia are a function of several factors, including distance between markets, mode of 
transportation, and cattle supply. Trekking cattle to markets can be a cheaper way of 
transportation, but the decision to trek is influenced by yet a different set of factors: security, 
availability of water and pasture, and the kind of relationship between the trader and ethnic 
groups residing en route.  The main commodity transported from Moyale to Nairobi is livestock, 
while a variety of merchandise – used-clothes, hardware materials, foodstuffs, timber, plastic 
ware, and household goods – are back-hauled from Nairobi to Moyale. The costs of hiring a 
truck from Nairobi to Moyale average about Ksh. 20,000, while the costs of transporting 
livestock from Moyale to Nairobi ranged between Ksh. 30,000 and 70,000 per trip from March 
2001 to February 2002 (Figure 10, Mahmoud 2003, p. 181). Confronted with such 
circumstances, transporters make up for losses by charging cattle traders exorbitantly high 
trucking costs (Mahmoud 2003: 181). 
  
Figure 10:  Truck hiring cost in northern Kenya (for cattle, Moyale to Nairobi)5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HIGH RISKS 
 
Livestock raiding has a rich and long history in the study area.  Oral histories refer to years of 
particularly devastating (or alternately, rewarding) raids in reference to the raids themselves.  
Since time immemorial, livestock have been subject to raids from other tribes, and other clans 
                                                          
5 Trough A represents low cattle trucking costs because of low levels of cattle supply from southern Ethiopia. 
Trough B represents low cattle trucking costs caused by low demand for beef in Nairobi. 
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within ethnic groups.  The influx of automatic weapons has altered the scope of the danger 
associated with raids, which continue to play a focal role in rites of passage ceremonies 
(Fleisher, 2000).   
  
Based on reports from the community surveys as to when residents had suffered raids, we were 
able to establish a dummy variable measure to capture the occurrence of a raid during a given 
survey period.  When we include that variable in our regression model, we find that insecurity 
significantly increases the likelihood of market participation, and also has a positive and 
statistically significant effect on net livestock purchases.  This is not a surprising conclusion.  
Instances of insecurity prompt pastoralists to relocate from relatively remote and dangerous areas 
to more populous areas closer to market, thereby increasing the likelihood of market 
participation.  Insecurity is also more likely to force pastoralists into the market to purchase 
animals to replace those lost to raiding. 
 
From the perspective of the trader, insecurity is the primary risk faced (Figure 11).  To deal with 
the risk of transporting large amounts of cash across long distances from northern Kenya  to 
Nairobi and vice versa, traders frequently use informal ‘money services’ to allow cash from 
Nairobi sales to be picked up back in Northern Kenya.  They may also transfer their cash in 
Nairobi to a wholesaler who is buying goods for transport to Moyale and the trader can then pick 
up the cash from the wholesaler’s business back in northern Kenya (Mahmoud, 2003).   
 
FIGURE 11:  Traders’ declared cattle marketing constraints in northern Kenya (N=71) 
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Source: Mahmoud (2003:161) 
Table 15:  Cattle trading partnerships and ethnicity in northern Kenya (N=54) 
 
Ethnic relations of trading partner 
 
Percent 
From the same ethnic group 96.3 
From a different ethnic group   3.7 
Total 100.00 
Source: Mahmoud (2003: 218) 
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To deal with security and market risks, traders in northern Kenya frequently form partnerships 
and place a partner in the Nairobi market.  These partnerships usually  (> 95 percent of the total) 
are among members of the same ethnic groups (Table 15).  Seventy-eight percent of traders in 
northern Kenya have at least one trading partner, although only 16 percent of Ethiopian traders 
do.  Trading risks increase as one approaches the terminal market in Nairobi, which may explain 
the different pattern of partnerships in the two regions (Mahmoud 2003: 216).  Partnerships also 
facilitate the collection of credit and payments from large Nairobi-based meat wholesalers, 
which can be a serious problem for northern Kenyan traders.  
 
 
F.  FRAGILE HERD STRUCTURE 
 
Though greater than 70% of total herd is typically comprised of female animals, while less than 
one third of marketed animals are female (Barrett et al, 2003), we investigated the effect of 
percentage of herd which is female upon the marketing behavior of the survey sample.  Kerven 
(1992, p. 109) asserts that historically livestock trade “provided [pastoralists] a vital means of 
restructuring or rebuilding herds or flocks, through conversion of one livestock species for 
another and by exchanging male for female animals.”  But as we have already demonstrated, 
pastoralists appear not to use markets much at all for purchases, almost exclusively for sales.  If 
pastoralists do not use markets for restocking or restructuring herds – most likely due to limited 
cash liquidity – then herd structure may impede marketing as well, in so far as herders try to hold 
onto fertile females and quality bulls for breeding.  We therefore hypothesize that since herd 
growth is critical to pastoralist welfare (Lybbert et al. forthcoming), and because herd growth 
comes overwhelmingly through biological reproduction (Table 8), pastoralists will be less likely 
to sell, for any given herd size, when a greater proportion of their livestock are female.  In a 
regression context, this hypothesis would imply a positive coefficient relating net TLU purchases 
to the percentage of their herd that is female, as a greater proportion of female animals means 
fewer males available for market.   
 
Our data fail to support that hypothesis.  The coefficient estimates on the percentage of females 
in the herd are negative in two of three regressions, albeit only statistically significant at 
relatively high p-values.  This further underscores the core point that northern Kenyan and 
southern Ethiopian pastoralists do not seem to be using markets to restructure or rebuild herds, 
contrary to existing claims in the literature.   
 
 
G.  BORDER CLOSURES AND QUARANTINES 
 
Parallel research in this region using detailed transactions data finds that quarantines are a 
significant source of price risk and that they reduce expected livestock prices received by 
pastoralists (Barrett et al. 2003).  Quarantine erects barriers to trade by impeding commerce and 
thinning markets in pastoral regions.  These effects not only exacerbate risk but also cause 
substantial revenue losses for herders.  Though the effects of quarantine upon livestock prices at 
terminal markets in Nairobi is negligible, Barrett et al. (2003) find significant negative effects on 
the prices received and the price variability faced by pastoralists.  Pastoralist producers absorb 
the price shock created by quarantines, simultaneously insulating both Nairobi consumers and 
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protecting highland ranchers.  As the highland subpopulations are much wealthier than northern 
pastoralists, quarantines appear a distributionally regressive means of animal disease control, 
wherin the poor pay the costs of benefits born largely by wealthier citizens. 
 
Though more prevalent in Kenya, where four instances occurred between June 2000 and June 
2001 as opposed to Ethiopia, quarantine remains a relatively infrequent event, making it a bit 
difficult to tease out marginal effects on pastoralist marketing behavior in our data.  In our 
model, we find quarantine to be insignificant in both the market participation as well as the  net 
purchases part of the regression model.  This result makes sense if we understand quarantines to 
affect pastoralist marketing behavior primarily through the prices they receive for their animals, 
given that we control separately for prices in this regression. Quarantine thus enters twice into 
the regression, once directly through the aggregate variable quarantine, and once indirectly, 
through its effects upon smallstock and largestock average prices.  The direct effects of 
quarantine, as reflected in the estimated sign of the livestock market participation variable, are 
negative but very close to and not statistically significantly different from zero, suggesting that 
quarantines have little or no effect on market participation beyond their price effects, which we 
have already established to be likewise close to zero due to pastoralists’ offsetting asset 
management and consumption smoothing objectives. 
  
We would expect traders to drop out of the market as quarantines are imposed, with a more 
pronounced effect the closer the market is to the place of the quarantine.  The traders who 
transport animals to the terminal market are the ones directly affected by the quarantine, as the 
smaller scale traders who trade in bush markets or secondary markets do not directly negotiate 
the quarantine as the quarantines borderline is drawn at the edge of the arid lands, protecting 
highland stock.   The data show that the secondary markets immediately closest to the terminal 
market in Nairobi are those most severely affected by the quarantines as evinced a drop in the 
number of traders.  The Kenyan markets closest to Nairobi typically characterized by a 
substantial number of traders, Ngambo and Suguta Marmar, suffer a nearly 50% decrease in the 
number of traders in times of quarantine (Table 16).  We similarly observe a muted effect in 
Finchawa, the most accessible of our Ethiopia sites.    
       
 
QUARANTINE Dirib Gombo Kargi Logo Logo Ngambo North Horr Suguta Marmar 
No 4.56 1.19 0.04 19.50 13.00 31.48 
Yes 6.00 2.00 0.00 11.00 n/a 17.20 
         
No Dida Hara Dillo Finchawa Qorate Wachille   
Yes 1.60 8.10 98.66 31.85 2.30   
  n/a n/a 96.07 n/a n/a   
  
 
V CONCLUSIONS 
Pastoralists in northern Kenya and southern Ethiopia participate actively in livestock markets.  
But the volumes transacted are small, limiting the possibility of any significant near term impact 
due to stimulus to broader regional and international marketing opportunities.  Market 
transactions are almost exclusively sales, primarily of small ruminants (goats and sheep), to meet  
Table 16: Average Number of Livestock Traders at Market 
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households’ immediate cash expenditure needs.  There is no strong price response, apparently 
because prices move largely with the net present value of animals, as determined by prevailing 
health and range conditions, and pastoralists balance long-term herd building objectives with 
short-term consumption smoothing objectives when deciding whether and what to sell.   
 
Overall, the strongest correlated of livestock marketing is herd size, suggesting that preserving or 
restoring the viability of large herds is the single most important factor in stimulating livestock 
marketing expansion in the arid and semi-arid lands of northern Kenya and southern Ethiopia.  
Cash marketing costs incurred by pastoralist households are surprisingly modest, holding bank 
accounts has, if anything, a negative effect on net sales, and information on climate and prices 
does not appear a significantly limiting factor on pastoralist market participation or sales 
volumes.  The complex property rights associated with traditional gifting and loan transactions 
indeed limit marketing, but they play an important safety net role for pastoralists exposed to 
considerable risk.  In sum, we find scant empirical support for many of the claims commonly 
made in current discussions of how best to stimulate livestock marketing off-take among 
pastoralists in this region.  The best strategy appears to be generalized support for viable 
pastoralism. 
 
Interventions probably make a greater difference at the level of traders.  Transport costs and 
physical insecurity pose problems more for traders than for individual pastoralists.  Quarantines 
and other impediments to trade in livestock clearly reduce the number of traders present in 
markets, reducing aggregate demand and thereby lowering prices and increasing the price risk 
faced by herders seeking to sell animals.  Clearly better control of security and improved 
transport and market infrastructure would benefit herders and traders and general market 
conditions in northern Kenya (as well as the elimination of outdated quarantine measures)  
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